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CHAPTER 8 
The Moral Status of Animal Research Subjects in 
Industry: A Stakeholder Analysis 
Sarah Kenehan 
Associate Professor, Philosophy Department, Marywood University, 
Pennsylvania, United States 
1 Introduction 
The use of non-human animals (hereinafter referred to as animals) in research 
and testing is a widely accepted practice in many industries. Millions of ani­
mals each year are subjected to painful procedures that include everything 
from physical mutilation to drug addiction. According to the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), over 820,812 animals were experimented 
on in the United States in 2016 (USDA, 2017), though this count does not in­
clude rats, mice, or birds, and dubiously relies solely on the self-reporting of 
laboratories (Humane Society of the United States, 2011; Keen, 2019, Chapter 
10 in this Volume). Estimates suggest that a more accurate count - one that 
includes rats, mice, and birds - brings the number closer to 25 million total 
animals used in the United States (Humane Society of the United States, 2013). 
These numbers raise many questions, not least of which is whether this prac­
tice is prima facie immoral. But this is not the broader question that I address 
in this chapter. Instead, I look at the continued use of animals for experiments 
from the point of view of business ethics, in particular, through the lens of 
stakeholder theory. Specifically, I argue that animals as research subjects are 
stakeholders in the corporations that practice animal experimentation, and 
this status demands that their interests be considered with the interests of 
other stakeholders. 
Importantly, while this chapter discusses issues of interest to a broader phi­
losophy audience, it is, nonetheless, situated in a volume whose purpose is, in 
part, to motivate practical paradigm change in the way that animal advocates 
think about their work. Not unlike other scholars, my own work is shaped by my 
personal experiences: I am a philosopher by training and an animal advocate 
outside the walls of the academy, so my concern for animals is both theoretical 
and pragmatic. As such, the practical import of this chapter speaks most obvi­
ously to people like me, i.e., advocates who are also academics. In particular, 
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arguing for the stakeholder status of animals in research corporations gives 
advocates (both academic and traditional) a new tool to use in the fight for the 
proper consideration of animal interests. It brings the conversation-in an or­
ganic and relevant way-to a group of people who would have likely remained 
uninformed of the issue, and offers defenders of animal interests the oppor­
tunity to employ a general method of advocacy that has historically been very 
successful. 
The argument in this chapter proceeds as follows. To begin, I discuss the 
broad and narrow interpretations of the stakeholder view, and I argue that the 
narrow view offers a more practical framework for making business decisions. 
Following this, I will show that, while no iteration of stakeholder theory ever 
directly identifies animals as stakeholders, the inclusion of research animals 
in this category is as self-evident as the inclusion of employees; minimally, 
this demands that the moral manager properly considers the interests that re­
search animals have in not suffering. I then contend that if research animals 
really are stakeholders, and if their interests really are more urgent than the 
interests of other stakeholders, then the presumed legitimacy of animal ex­
perimentation needs to be reevaluated. Finally, in the last section I offer some 
responses to three potential objections to the arguments put forth in this chap­
ter. Ultimately, I conclude that, from the point of view of stakeholder theory, 
animal experimentation, especially when it inflicts suffering on animal sub­
jects, is not justifiable. 
2 Narrow and Broad Interpretations of the Stakeholder View 
Stakeholder theorists claim that the purpose of the corporation is to harmonize 
the interests of the stakeholders, though there is not widespread agreement on 
how to identify stakeholders (Goodpaster, 1991 , p. 66). Indeed, Mitchell et al. 
(1997) have catalogued 27 different conceptions of the stakeholder, including 
some of the following: 
A stakeholder is/stakeholders are: 
- a person or group, "which the organization is dependent on for its contin­
ued survival" (Freeman and Reid, 1983, p. 9 1 ;  Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 858) 
- a person or group, "that benefit[ s] from or are harmed by, and whose rights 
are violated or respected by, corporate actions." (Evan and Freeman, 1988 , 
p. 79; Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 858) 
- "constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm [ ... ] established 
through the existence of an exchange relationship" and who supply "the 
firm with critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects 
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its interests to be satisfied" (Hill and Jones, 1992, p. 133; Mitchell et al. 1997, 
p.858) 
- a person or group "having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with an 
organization [ such as] exchange transactions, action impacts, and moral re­
sponsibilities" (Brenner, 1993, p. 205 ; Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 858) 
- "the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a 
moral or legal claim on the firm" (Langtry, 1994 , p. 433; Mitchell et al., 1997, 
p.858) 
- and "persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or sub­
stantive aspects of corporate activity." (Donaldson and Preston, 1995 , p. 85 ; 
Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 858). 
The most frequently cited stakeholder theorist, Edward Freeman (1984), de­
scribes a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (p. 46). Of course, like 
many of the others, this definition is vague, and much is left to interpretation. 
But, broadly construed, this definition commonly includes the government, 
the environment, and many third-party associations ( e.g., the suppliers of a 
supplier), in addition to the commonly recognized stakeholder groups: own­
ers, suppliers, employees, customers, and local community. On this, the wide 
interpretation, the category of stakeholder is quickly rendered unruly and in­
significant, as it can be expanded to include just about any person or group 
(for the origin of this distinction, see Freeman and Reed, 1983). As Orts and 
Strudler (2002, p. 218) note, "virtually anyone and anything can 'affect or be 
affected' by the decisions and actions of business enterprise. Expansive views 
of relevant 'stakeholders' tend easily to become so broad as to be meaningless 
and so complex as to be useless." Clearly then, we are in need of a refined un­
derstanding of the concept of stakeholder. 
One such definition proposes that stakeholders be identified as those 
groups, "who are vital to the survival and success of the firm" (Evan and Free­
man 1998 , p. 58), or who are "definitional to the firm" (Freeman et al., 2002, p. 
31). According to this narrow view, stakeholders are much easier to identify, 
thus, making this view more workable from a management standpoint. Surely, 
though, one might argue that by limiting the account of stakeholders to the 
narrow interpretation, we risk overlooking groups and entities that deserve 
consideration when business decisions are made. But, importantly, stakehold­
er status is not the sole identifier of moral considerability. For example, Orts 
and Strudler (2002, p. 221) state that businesses have moral obligations to obey 
the law, even if it conflicts with stakeholder interests. 
Of course, neither the narrow nor the wide view of stakeholder identifi­
cation is without its difficulties. The most obvious difficulty, for both, is that 
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regardless of how stakeholders are identified, complications arise in balancing 
the claims and interests of the various stakeholder groups, as stakeholder iden­
tification alone does not address which claims or interests are the most impor­
tant, at what time. Nonetheless, going forward, I adopt a narrow interpretation 
of stakeholder identification, as the broad view renders the moral manager 
impotent in their decision-making. Indeed, the narrow view is most widely 
defended by stakeholder theorists and is most widely adopted by managers 
( e.g., see Mitchell et al., 1996, and references therein). Even so, it is not the 
purpose of this chapter to defend one conception of stakeholder identifica­
tion over another. Rather, my goal is much less lofty: it is simply to show that 
even according to the narrow conception of stakeholder ( and so presumably 
also the wide conception), animals who are experimented on can be properly 
construed as stakeholders in the corporations that conduct these experiments. 
As such, their interests cannot be disregarded. 
3 Research Animals, Stakeholders, Suffering, and Compassion 
3.1 Research Animal,s as Stakeholders 
As noted, the narrow interpretation of stakeholder restricts stakeholders to 
those groups "who are definitional to the firm" (p. 31, Freeman et al., 2002 ). 
This interpretation is commonly thought to include customers, suppliers, fi­
nanciers, employees, and parts of the local community. However, given the 
fact that many businesses rely heavily on research animals to bring products 
to market, then these animals are very likely stakeholders too, analogous to 
suppliers and/or employees. Consider, for instance, the use of animals in the 
Draize eye irritancy test, an experiment that is used by an array of companies 
to evaluate how irritating a particular substance is. (Notably, the use of this 
test has decreased, as it was banned for use in cosmetics testing in the EU, 
India, Israel, and New Zealand, though it is still used quite often in the us and 
elsewhere (Cruelty Free International, 2017). In this test, animals (typically 
rabbits) may be unable to move for days while chemicals are applied to their 
eyes, and usually the animal subjects are given no more than a topical anes­
thetic, so long as it does not interfere with the experiment. Sometimes these 
tests result in infection and/or tissue damage that is so severe that the animal 
is rendered blind (Humane Society International, n.d. ). If these animals can­
not be re-used in future tests (because of the damage done by previous tests) 
they are killed, usually by being suffocated, having her neck broken, or by be­
ing decapitated (Humane Society of the United States, 2018). Without the in­
formation this test supplies, many companies would be unwilling or unable to 
bring their products to market. Therefore, it may be said that the animals on 
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whom the Draize test and other such tests rely are central to the successes of 
the companies that depend on these practices. 
Like human employees, research animals offer a very specific type of labor, 
without which the company would potentially suffer severe financial penal­
ties. These animals are sometimes subjected to painful tests for years at a time 
without any form of relief or compensation. They are forced to give their free­
dom, their health, their well-being, and their lives to these companies. And like 
the suppliers of a company, animal subjects of experimentation provide the 
business with the raw materials and services that it needs to make its product; 
but in the case of the laboratory animals, the materials that are being supplied 
are the bodies and lives of the animal subjects. Without these "materials", com­
panies would not be able to perform the Draize tests or similar experiments. 
As such, research animals are stakeholders, even on the narrow conception, in 
the companies that use them. They are, like an employee or supplier, integral 
to the operations of the firm, and so, accordingly, their interests must be con­
sidered as any other stakeholder's interests would. 
Importantly, establishing that research animals are stakeholders does not 
help in the identification of the relevant interests deserving of consideration, 
nor does it tell us how to balance these interests against other stakeholder 
claims; though, to be clear, this ambiguity does not mean that we are justified 
in subordinating non-human animal interests to human interests. There are 
likely to be many workable routes for identifying and managing stakeholder 
interests, but for brevity, I focus on one possible way to identify the interests 
that matter in this context, and I will likewise propose one way that we might 
commensurate the interests of competing stakeholder groups. 
3.2 Commensurating Stakeholder Interests: Suffering and Compassion 
The phrase to have an interest means that something (A) has welfare or 
well-being, such that, "having or doing X would ( or we think it would) ben­
efit A, that having or doing X would make a contribution to Ns well-being" 
(Regan, 1983, p. 88). Based on this understanding, animals, at the very least, 
have a basic and fundamental interest in not suffering, and they probably also 
have interests in enjoying their lives and avoiding untimely deaths (though, 
for the purpose of this chapter, I refrain from relying on the latter two). The 
interest in not suffering is, as Singer and Bentham point out, a prerequisite 
for having any other interests, and so it is prior to and more urgent than any 
other interests (Singer, 2002, p. 7). This establishes one possible way to bal­
ance stakeholder interests: the more foundational and urgent the interest, the 
more heavily it is weighted. To be sure, the experiments that animals are sub­
jected to in research laboratories are directly and obviously contrary to their 
interest in not suffering. Furthermore, given the fundamental nature of this 
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interest, and the systematic way in which it is violated, its proper consider­
ation is likely much more urgent and pressing than the consideration of other 
legitimate stakeholder concerns and so should be prioritized by the decision 
maker. 
Of course, it might be argued that engaging in medical research in which ani­
mals are used as test subjects helps us to take account of a sick person's inter­
est in not suffering, an interest that may be just as urgent as the interest of the 
laboratory animal. Let us assume for the sake of argument that this is true, i.e., 
that medial research on animals is the only way in which the cures and treat­
ments for some illnesses will ever be discovered. If this is the case, then when 
we choose not to engage in animal research, are we then also choosing to ignore 
the interest that sick people have in not suffering? Put in the context of business 
ethics, the moral manager may be tom between causing suffering to animals 
and potentially preventing suffering that would otherwise happen to humans, 
and refusing to impose suffering on animals but allowing sick people to suf­
fer. This is a complex moral issue, but one possible way to navigate through 
this terrain is to think about those qualities that we would expect the moral 
manager to have and then explore how those qualities may direct them in this 
situation. 
Surely, one important quality of the moral manager would be compassion. 
Indeed, Solomon (1999, Chapter 3) lists compassion as one among many of 
the business virtues, explaining that the directive of compassion is to relieve 
suffering: "Within the corporation, compassion is often called for [ ... ] Compas­
sion, of course, can be expensive [ ... ] but what is less obvious is the enormous 
expense of not having or expressing compassion, in further lost time and the 
distraction that comes of suffering through hardship alone, in the insecurity 
and consequent lack of devotion of not only the employee in question but 
of everyone around, in seething resentment. Compassion, like caring, is not 
merely a humanizing embellishment in the otherwise businesslike life of a 
corporation. It is essential to the very life of that corporation as a human com­
munity." While Solomon beautifully articulates the importance of compassion 
towards employees as humans, notably absent from this characterization is 
concern for animal suffering. It is unclear how Solomon thinks that the moral 
manager should consider animals' interests in not suffering, but regardless of 
Solomon's own position, the principle of equality requires that, "suffering be 
counted equally with like suffering-in so far as rough comparisons can be 
made-of any other being" (Singer, 2008, p. 37 ). This is a basic principle of fair­
ness, and to violate it on the basis of one's race, gender, or even species would 
be arbitrary and wrong. Therefore, the moral manager should be concerned 
not just with the suffering of the humans in their corporate community, but 
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also with the animals in their corporate community; this is what fairness and 
compassion demand. 
So, the question is now: Can the virtue of compassion help us to mitigate 
the conflict between the human interest in not suffering and the animal inter­
est in not suffering, as described above? I think so. Consider this dilemma, as 
explored by Simmons (2016, p. 1 13): 
What is the compassionate thing to do in this case? It seems ambiguous 
since one can be compassionate to humans by promoting their interests 
in continued life. I contend, however, that to refrain from killing animals, 
even at the potential cost of failing to benefit human health, is the more 
fully compassionate thing to do. To kill animals in order to save human 
lives entails offensively ( i.e., aggressively) and intentionally causing harm 
to others without their consent. Indeed, it is an act of aggression, vio­
lence, and domination, even if done to help others [ ... ] [T]o intentionally, 
offensively inflict harm on another shows, to some degree, a lack of con­
cern for the other's welfare [ ... ] On the other hand, to refrain from killing 
animals, at the potential cost of not saving human lives, need not show 
any lack of concern for human welfare. It is not offensively causing harm 
to humans; it is merely failing to help them. 
Importantly, Simmons (2016) argues that failing to mitigate the harms suffered 
by the humans that result from their diseases is not actually the result of moral 
indifference, nor the result of intentionally wanting the humans to suffer. In­
stead, "A fully compassionate person aims to prevent harm to individuals but 
will not offensively, intentionally inflict harm on others in the process of doing 
so" (p. 1 14 ). If Simmons is correct, then the moral manager will not allow the 
infliction of suffering on animals for the sake of preventing human suffering. 
Of course, the case above assumes that there will always be a conflict 
between the animal interest in not suffering and the human interest in not 
suffering. But, this is a false dichotomy. This supposed conflict rests on two 
assumptions: first, that medical research nearly always results in cures or treat­
ments that can effectively alleviate human suffering; and second, that the re­
lief of human suffering can only be achieved by inflicting suffering on animals. 
Neither of these assumptions is valid. Research has actually shown that animal 
experiments done with the purpose of extrapolating results relevant to human 
health are notoriously ineffective. Pharmaceuticals tested on animals have a 
go% failure rate (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 
201s; 2016); this means that they are certified safe from animal studies, then 
fail in human clinical trials or once they reach the market. Additionally, there 
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are many non-animal testing methods that can be used in place of animal ex­
perimentation. These include, but are not limited to: epidemiological studies 
( studies of human populations); clinical research; bioinformatics ( statistical 
evaluation of biology); systems biology (studies of interaction between bio­
logical systems); tissue engineering (a combination of engineering principles 
and biology); microfluidics ( organ on a chip); in vitro (human cell and tissue 
cultures) research; in silico ( computer-based) techniques; stem cell methods; 
genetic methods; advanced imaging technologies; and safe human-based stud­
ies ( see Chapters in Part 7 in this Volume: Hartung, 2019; Noor, 2019; Taylor, 
2019; Wilkinson, 2019 ). As such, there are ways to relieve human suffering that 
do not demand that we inflict suffering on animals. We can conclude, then, 
that it is unlikely ( though not impossible) that the interest humans and non­
human animals have in not suffering will not conflict as obviously or as regu­
larly as commonly thought. 
3.3 Summary 
In this section I have argued that, by definition, research animals can be cat­
egorized as stakeholders in businesses that engage in animal experimentation 
or testing. In most cases of animal experimentation, the interest being violated 
is the animal's interest in not suffering, an interest that is, more often than not, 
more urgent than the interests of competing stakeholders. And, furthermore, 
in taking the virtue of compassion seriously, the moral manager can mitigate 
conflicts that arise between two groups of stakeholders that may both have 
an interest in not suffering; in particular, compassion demands that we do 
not intentionally cause harm to one group, even if we do it to prevent harm 
to another group. As such, stakeholder theory demands that, at a minimum, 
managers have a moral imperative to stop animal experimentation that inflicts 
suffering on animal subjects. 
4 Objections 
In this final section, I address some potential objections to my argument. 
4.1 Objection 1: Aren't There Laws in Place that Already Protect the 
Interests of Animal Subjects? 
Those familiar with the practice of animal experimentation may be tempt­
ed to claim that advocating for the interests of animals as stakeholders is 
unnecessary, since there are already laws and regulations in place that serve 
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to protect the interests of animal subjects. One such law, in the us , is the us 
Animal Welfare Act (AwA) (1966, last amended 2013). In fact, the AWA does set 
minimal requirements for the care of certain animal species used in laborato­
ries, ensuring that they have water, food, and shelter. Even so, these minimal 
standards fail to adequately protect an animal's interest in not suffering; and 
further, simple adherence to the AWA is not an appropriate tool for gauging if 
an animal's interest in not suffering has actually been respected. To begin, the 
Act only demands adequate food, shelter, and water be provided outside the 
demands of the experiment; that is, as a matter of experimentation, animals 
can be denied these things and, worse, for sustained periods of time. Indeed, 
it is not uncommon for animals to be subjected to radiation exposure; shock 
therapy; exposure to nerve gas; mutilation; social isolation; drug overdose and 
addiction; starvation and dehydration; oxygen deprivation; surgery without 
anesthesia; poisoning; induction of psychopathology, including depression (in 
higher primates); deprivation studies; extreme temperature exposure; toxicity 
tests; and immersion and injection studies (Singer, 2002, Chapter 2). Second, 
the Act does not cover mice, rats, birds, or reptiles; so, these animals-the ani­
mals who comprise the majority of laboratory animals-are not guaranteed 
any protections (us Animal Welfare Act, 1966, last amended 2013). And finally, 
the Act presumes that experimentation on animals is actually acceptable, thus 
subordinating the interests of animals from the outset, as do all similar regula­
tions. Clearly then, simply adhering to the Animal Welfare Act ( or similar rules 
in other countries) does not guarantee that a company has rightfully consid­
ered the interests of its animal test subjects. As such, there is good reason to 
identify research animals as stakeholders. 
4.2 Objection 2: What About the Other Stakeholders? 
What if taking this argument seriously meant that a company had to shut its 
doors? This is an important concern, but I think we can address it by first think­
ing about a less controversial case. Consider a world in which multi-national 
corporations that rely on child labor were forced to actually take the interests 
of their child laborers into consideration, minimally, the children's interests in 
not suffering. For some corporations, taking these interests seriously may only 
require making some changes, e.g., finding new laborers, relocating plants, re­
moving some products from the market. But for other corporations, respecting 
these interests may mean that they have to halt their operations completely. 
Would we, should we, object to these closures? In doing so, would we not be 
saying that the protection of the fundamental interests that the children have 
in not suffering ( among other interests) is not as important as the survival of 
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the corporation? This seems to be an indefensible claim: a concern for maxi­
mizing profits does not trump all other concerns. This is not to say that the 
profit interests of the other stakeholders are not important or serious, but rath­
er, the urgency of the interests being violated in this case gives priority to the 
children. Put more generally, in instances in which there is a serious and sys­
tematic violation of basic interests, we should be comfortable with the closure 
of companies that rely on these violations for their continuation. This holds 
whether the interests in question stem from human or non-human stakehold­
ers, as fairness demands that we give equal consideration for equal interests. 
Of course, this assumes that the animal experimentation and financial suc­
cess are necessarily linked, meaning that corporations will disappear without 
the ability to engage in animal experimentation. But, this is absolutely not the 
case, since viable alternatives to animal testing exist or can be developed. In 
fact, many companies have already moved towards this change ( many were 
forced in this direction as a result of the E U  ban on cosmetics implemented in 
2013). And even other companies have, from their inception, made it part of 
their mission statement to avoid cruel animal experimentation. The contin­
ued success of such companies ( and the industries in which they are situated) 
shows that businesses can remain financially viable without experimenting 
on animals. So, forgoing animal experimentation does not necessitate that 
a business close its doors, and this means that the reduction and eventual 
elimination of animal experimentation would not necessarily conflict with 
the interests that the other stakeholders have in the financial success of their 
corporations. 
4.3 Objection 3: Why Business Ethics? ( Or, What is the Practical Import of 
this Argument for the Animal Advocate?) 
One might wonder what value a business ethics approach to this issue offers, 
given that so many moral theorists have already convincingly argued that 
animal experimentation is, in most cases, wrong ( e.g., DeGrazia, 1996; Regan, 
1983; Singer, 2002 ). Likewise, animal advocates may wonder how this argument 
practically advances the movement to see the interests of research animals 
properly protected. As an academic and an advocate, I see these two concerns 
as inextricably linked, and I strongly believe that the stakeholder approach to 
considering animal interests is a tool that can be employed in the academy and 
in the social/political space where traditional advocacy occurs. 
Perhaps, unsurprisingly, I agree that there are many compelling arguments 
that successfully condemn the practice of animal experimentation. Even so, 
there are several reasons why framing this issue from the point of view of busi­
ness ethics can be helpful. First, it seems quite obvious-especially in light of 
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the arguments developed above-that laboratory animals are stakeholders 
in the institutions that practice animal experimentation. And yet, nowhere 
in the vast stakeholder literature are these particular animals referenced or 
acknowledged. Occasionally, a theorist will consider the possibility of the en­
vironment as a stakeholder, and so by default the wild animals who live in the 
environment become stakeholders in a way, but animals confined to a life in 
a laboratory are never mentioned ( e.g., Bowie, 2009; Orts and Strudler, 2002 ). 
This seems to me a serious oversight, and so, academically, this subject deserves 
consideration. But, beyond the rather obvious scholarly omission, business stu­
dents are unlikely to be taught animal ethics in business school, and it is similar­
ly unlikely that they are required to take courses in ethical theory. Instead, they 
may be required to take a course in business ethics, where they study stakehold­
er and stockholder theory, the various forms of contracts, sexual harassment/ 
discrimination, and the like. These issues are undoubtedly important; however, 
given the moral urgency surrounding the practice of animal experimentation, 
it is likewise very important to discuss the rightness or wrongness of using ani­
mals as test subjects, especially with those who will be in a position to benefit 
from the practice. Notably, discussing the morality of animal experimentation 
by exploring the argument that animals are stakeholders allows, in a very natu­
ral and cohesive way, business students to think about the use of animals as 
test subjects, using language and ideas that they are already familiar with and 
comfortable using, and so this approach offers business students both substan­
tive and directive guidance in considering animal interests. Furthermore, ex­
posing business students to this way of thinking is crucially important, since, in 
the very near future, many of them may be in a position to make decisions that 
reflect a real moral concern for animal subjects in a way that other people will 
never have the opportunity to do ( there are only so many of us that will man­
age laboratories and the like). Thus, I see this argument as giving the academic 
advocate a route to introducing concern for laboratory animals in a way that 
utilizes a framework that is already accepted by the typical business student. 
In addition, it is also worth noting that, historically speaking, the general 
method of arguing for stakeholder status is typically a part of any success­
ful route to having an oppressed or exploited group's interests properly con­
sidered. Even if the technical language of stakeholder is not employed, one 
way to interpret the historical inclusion of many stakeholder groups is as a 
fight to have stakeholder status properly recognized. Several examples fit this 
characterization, including the restriction on child laborers in the late In­
dustrial Revolution and, more recently, the movement to properly recognize 
the interests of adjunct professors at universities in the us ( at some institu­
tions, at least). In these cases and others like them, the moral arguments for 
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stakeholder status preceded the adoption of legal safeguards that formalized 
limits on what could be done to these groups in the name of maximizing prof­
its. Many students of business are taught not just to respect these limits legally, 
but to understand why they are so important. Indeed, many such principles 
are built into professional codes of ethics and corporate mission statements, 
both of which help to influence corporate cultures and set expectations for 
managers. This general sort of social evolution gives us good reason to believe 
that classifying animals as stakeholders can be understood as a natural exten­
sion of the principles and guidelines that many business people and corpora­
tions already adhere to and endorse, and that real protections for research 
animals ( as real protections for any other stakeholder group) do not necessar­
ily have to be interpreted as completely and arbitrarily contrary to the profit­
ability of the business. 
Finally, and perhaps obviously, my argument could easily be extended to 
corporations that raise animals for food or use animals in entertainment; any 
use of animals for the sake of profit-making automatically qualifies them as 
stakeholder, and so, as such, they should be afforded the rights and consider­
ations of these groups. This means that the case made above will have applica­
bility for animal advocates in ways that extend far beyond the moral and legal 
consideration of animals used for research and testing. 
5 Conclusion 
I have argued that research animals are analogous to a company's employees 
and/or suppliers and can thus be considered stakeholders according to the 
narrow conception of stakeholder identification. If this categorization is cor­
rect, then businesses have an obligation to consider the interests of these 
animals, including, minimally, their interests in avoiding suffering. In addi­
tion, I have argued that the interest in not suffering is very likely more urgent 
and fundamental than the legitimate interests of the other stakeholder groups 
and so should be treated as such. Therefore, according to stakeholder theory, 
corporations should refrain from using animals as test subjects, especially 
when such testing inflicts suffering on the animal subjects. Moreover, beyond 
offering an interesting theoretical claim, the arguments in this chapter give 
advocates (both academic and traditional) a new tool to use in the fight for 
the proper consideration of animal interests by making the issue relevant to 
a broader audience. It brings the conversation in a pertinent and topical way 
to a group of people who would have likely remained uninformed of the topic 
and offers advocates the opportunity to employ a method of advocacy that 
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has historically been very successful. There are, then, both moral and practi­
cal reasons for including research animals as stakeholders in corporations that 
engage in animal research and testing. 
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